movement that overthrew the hated Soeharto regime in Indonesia it is
time to draw a balance sheet of what was achieved and what the state of
the movement is now. As the crisis of worldwide capitalism begins to
bite, Indonesia too is faced with a new situation, one where the working
class and youth will seek to learn the lessons of the past. This
two-part document attempts to draw those lessons.
Trisakti, 1998. Photo: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of INdonesia.Marxist
analysis and perspective on the Indonesian economy and politics is
still rather limited for a country which ranks as the fourth most
populous country in the world, a country with the largest Muslim
population, and the most dominant country in Southeast Asia. The lack of
such analysis can be traced back to the historical defeat of the
Indonesian working class movement in 1965, which can be said to be as
significant as the defeat of the German working class when the Nazis
came to power.
With the resurgence of Marxism in Indonesia, the need for an economic
and political perspective from a Marxist point of view has become a
priority. From a correct perspective flows correct action that can bring
the emancipation of the Indonesian working class and other oppressed
layers of society: the poor peasants, fishermen and urban poor. The
current perspectives document is by no means the first attempt at such
perspective, and it won’t be the last, especially with the current
turbulent world we are living. It will be the first estimation from
which we can gain an understanding of what needs to be done.
Furthermore, a serious revolutionary defines his or her task from an
international angle not because of sentimental values of
internationalism but because the very fact that capitalism is
international. While for all practical purposes, the workers must
organise themselves at home as a class with their country as their
immediate arena of struggle, the real content of the class struggle is
international. Therefore, this document has to be read in conjunction
with the 2010 World Perspective document, or else it will lose all its
value. We only have to see the political writings of Tan Malaka (Naar de Republik, Massa Aksi, Thesis,
etc) where he always started with international appraisals before going
into the political perspective of the Indonesian revolution.
The History of “Massa Aksi”
Indonesian history has always been the most important aspect for the
movement. The perversion of history by the Soeharto regime was so
complete that the first important act of the Indonesian movement was to
restore the history of “Massa Aksi”. 32 years of reaction under Soeharto
had not only physically destroyed the working class movement but also
ideologically stripped the movement completely of its tradition of mass
struggle. “Floating masses”, that is the terminology used to describe
the kind of society that the Soeharto regime constructed: depoliticised, historical and demobilised.
Thus, for many youth, the vanguard of the movement, relearning the
tradition of “Massa Aksi” was a revolutionary act, and it is still a
revolutionary act. The Soeharto regime was very afraid of the history of
Indonesia, and rightly so because the history of Indonesia is a
negation of the “floating mass” concept. One such work which had a very
strong influence in this process is the Buru Tetralogy novels written by
Pramoedya Ananta Toer. His works are comparable to Chernyshevsky’s What is to be Done?,
part fiction and part propaganda, a work that influenced a whole
generation of Russian youth who were to become the Bolsheviks and lead
the October Revolution. Not surprisingly, within one year of
publication, the novels were banned by the regime. But this didn’t stop
the books from being distributed and read clandestinely by the youth.
The history of Indonesia is one which is rich in Massa Aksi. Since
the awakening of nationalism, mass mobilisation has been the main trait.
Contrary to what the Soeharto regime tried to portray, the Indonesian
national liberation struggle was not one fought solely on the military
plane. It was one fought on the political plane with mass mobilisation.
Even when it was fought on the military plane, the army took the form of
a people’s militia whose control was under that of the mass
organisations.
Until 1965, all layers of Indonesian society were politically
mobilised. Politics penetrated all aspects of life. There was a
situation of pitched class struggle at that time. The 1960s was a period
of revolution (and counter-revolution) throughout the world. The G30S
incident spelt a complete reversal of this and Indonesia was never to be
same anymore.
The 1965 counter-revolution
What happened to the Indonesian Communist Party? This is the burning
question that still plagues the minds of Indonesian revolutionaries. It
is therefore fitting for us to visit this question before we go on to
address the 1998 Reformasi and later the prospect for the coming
revolution in Indonesia.
Prior to its annihilation, the Indonesian Communist Party claimed 3
million members. The PKI also had many affiliated and sympathising mass
organisations: Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth) with 1.5 million members,
SOBSI (Indonesian Centre of Workers’ Organisations) with 3.8 million
members (out of a total of 7 million organised workers), the BTI
(Peasants Front of Indonesia) with 5 million members, and Gerwani
(Indonesian Women’s Movement) with 750,000 members.1
This made the PKI the third largest communist party in the world after
that of the Soviet Union and China. In one stroke, and without any
significant resistance, the PKI – and with it the whole workers’ and
peasants’ movement – was decimated by the reactionary generals under the
guidance of the “democratic” imperialist forces. What followed was a
32-year period of reaction. There is no defeat more demoralising than
one without a fight.
The savagery of the ruling class is not something that we should be
surprised at. Since the first attempt of the proletarian revolution,
i.e. the Paris Commune in 1871, the ruling class has been brutal in
their counterattacks. To put it into perspective, the failure of the
Paris Commune resulted in the massacre of around 80,000 people in a town
of 1.8 million people. Indonesia’s population was 90 million at the
time of the 1965-66 massacre. The reasons for the failure of the
Indonesian revolution lie deeper than in the mere savagery or trickery
of the ruling class. That factor is a given. The important factor for us
lies in the incorrect political line of the PKI.
The PKI was the mass workers’ party of Indonesia. However, it had the
misfortune of being developed under the guidance of the Russian and
Chinese Stalinists after the 1926-27 failed putsch. When the party was
officially re-established again in 1945, like many other communist
parties it had become the tool of Moscow’s foreign policy and took an
incorrect policy that brought about the demise of the working class
movement. It is important here to separate the genuine desire of these
leaders (Aidit, Njoto, Lukman, Sudisman) to liberate the workers and
peasants from their obvious political errors, or else we would not be
able to move forward.
By the late 1930s, the Communist Party of Soviet Union was no longer
the same party that had led the October Revolution. It had become the
tool of the Soviet bureaucracy to maintain its privileges. It was no
longer in their interests to fight for world socialism despite the
rhetoric of the party. It sought to peacefully co-exist with capitalism
and thus became an active brake on the socialist struggle around the
world. The Chinese Communist Party was built on the image of the CPSU;
thus the Chinese state started off where the Russian Revolution ended,
i.e. as a deformed workers’ state. These two states were a massive
political influence in the working class movement throughout the whole
period.
This historical fact determined the fate of many communist parties
around the world. The leadership of the PKI was educated in the
Stalinist “two-stage theory” (which was in fact a rehashing of Menshevik
policy) which in essence says that in an undeveloped country like
Indonesia the first stage of the revolution is of a bourgeois democratic
character in order to abolish feudalism and imperialism. Thus, the task
of the communists in such country is to ally with the progressive
bourgeoisie, to subordinate class struggle to national struggle against
feudalism and imperialism. Only after this a gateway will be opened for
class struggle toward socialism.
From “Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution (Basic Problems of the Indonesian Revolution)”2,
which was a political perspective of the PKI written by D. N. Aidit, “a
manual for use in the Party Schools at the centre and in the provinces
and approved by the CC Plenum, July 1957”, we will examine closely the
“two-stage theory” of the PKI and the many contradictions of its theory
and policy.
The documents started with the appraisal of current Indonesian
society, which it claimed to be semi-feudal and semi-colonial. From here
it flows that the “main enemy of the Indonesia revolution at the
present stage is… imperialism and feudalism.”3
This is the first error. Fundamentally, Indonesian society has long
been a capitalist society. Its mode of production is dominated by the
capitalist mode of production, which is private ownership of the means
of production. The Indonesian economy has been tied to capitalism since
its first contact with the Dutch colonial power more than 400 years ago
(see Appendix “The History of Capitalist Development in Indonesia”). It
is semi-feudal only in the sense that the national bourgeoisie – like
any other national bourgeoisie in undeveloped countries – was never able
to carry out its historical task of agrarian reform, not then and not
even now. It was semi-colonial only in the sense that within the context
of global capitalism and the uneven development of capitalism, like
many other smaller capitalist countries, it becomes a prey of bigger
capitalist countries.
From this fundamental error flows the idea that the task of
Indonesian revolution is to create “a people’s government” and that
“this government (the People’s Democratic Government) is not a
government of the dictatorship of the proletariat but a government of
the dictatorship of the people.”4 (page 57).
Marx and Engels, and later Lenin, fought valiantly against the concept of the “people’s state”. Lenin in his State and Revolution explained this clearly:
“The ‘free people’s state’ was a programme demand and a catchword
current among the German Social-Democrats in the seventies [1870]. This
catchword is devoid of all political content except that it describes
the concept of democracy in a pompous philistine fashion. Insofar as it
hinted in a legally permissible manner at a democratic republic, Engels
was prepared to ‘justify’ its use ‘for a time’ from an agitational point
of view. But it was an opportunist catchword, for it amounted to
something more than prettifying bourgeois democracy, and was also
failure to understand the socialist criticism of the state in general.
(…) Furthermore, every state is a “special force” for the suppression
of the oppressed class. Consequently, every state is not ‘free’ and not
a ‘people’s state’. Marx and Engels explained this repeatedly to their
party comrades in the seventies.” (Lenin, State and Revolution) [Emphasis added]
Soekarno’s government was not a military dictatorship. Under his
government, the communists were given free reign; they occupied cabinet
and parliamentary posts. Engels was prepared to give some temporary
justification for the usage of the agitational slogan “people’s state”
in German in 1870s as they were living under a German Empire, an
autocracy. But that was not the case in Indonesia under Soekarno. The
slogan of the “people’s state” of the PKI was just another capitulation
of the working class program to the national bourgeoisie.
In order to justify its two-stage policy, a progressive national
bourgeoisie had to be created. Thus, the PKI twisted and turned to
redefine the nature of the bourgeois class in Indonesia:
“The bourgeois class is composed of compradors and the national
bourgeoisie. The big bourgeoisie that is comprador in character directly
serves the interests of the big foreign capitalists and is thus
fattened up by them (…) However, the national bourgeoisie displays two
features. As a class that is also suppressed by imperialism and the
whole development is also stifled by feudalism, this class is
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal, and in this respect it is one of the
revolutionary forces. (…) The Indonesian national bourgeoisie, because
it too is oppressed by foreign imperialism can, in certain
circumstances, and within certain limits, take part in the struggle
against imperialism. In such specific circumstances, the Indonesian proletariat must build unity with the national bourgeoisie and preserve this unity with all its strength.”5 [Emphasis added]
So, there is a good bourgeoisie and there is a bad bourgeoisie. This
thesis runs contrary to the Marxist class analysis. It is true that at
any given time there can be splits amongst the ruling class as one
section might have different secondary economic or political
interests than the other sections. However, the primary interest of the
whole bourgeoisie remains the same: the subjugation of the working
class. The whole existence of this class is based on its rule over the
proletariat.
The Indonesian national bourgeoisie was born late in history. Since
the beginning, its existence was tied to imperialism. Even worse, unlike
the national bourgeoisies of other developing countries (India and
China for example) who played a more active and dominant role in the
nationalist movement although in the end they too were incapable of
completing the national liberation movement the Indonesian native
bourgeoisie never led the nationalist movement.
With their incorrect appraisal of the national bourgeoisie, the PKI
then actively sought an alliance with the “progressive bourgeoisie” by
subordinating class struggle to national struggle, subordinating the
working class to the national bourgeoisie despite their lip service to
the fact that “the Indonesian revolution will not succeed unless it is
under the leadership of the Indonesian proletariat.”6
History has not been kind on those who have been trying to find a
progressive national bourgeoisie as one has yet to be found. Where was
the progressive bourgeoisie when the PKI was crushed and millions of
their supporters persecuted? Where was the progressive bourgeoisie
during the military dictatorship of Soeharto?
The inconsistencies of PKI theory on the nature of the national bourgeoisie become even more vulgar:
“In facing the wavering characteristics of the Indonesian national bourgeoisie, attention should be paid to the fact that it is precisely because it is politically and economically weak
that it is not very difficult to pull this class to the left, to make
it stand firmly on the side of the revolution, so long as the
progressive forces are large and the tactics of the Communist Party are
correct. This means that the wavering element of this class is not
fatal, it is not insurmountable. But on the other hand, if the
progressive forces are not large and the tactics of the Communist Party
not correct, then this economically weak and politically weak national
bourgeoisie can easily run to the right and become hostile to the
revolution.”7 [Emphasis added]
If the national bourgeoisie is already “politically and economically
weak”, all the more reason to cast it aside. It is because they are weak
that they are not to be made allies. In a war, allying yourself with a
weak ally is never advisable because instead of strengthening your force
you will find your force compromised.
Sadly enough, we are seeing the same argument now being used by the
PRD/PAPERNAS to justify their turn towards an alliance with the national
bourgeoisie. History repeats itself, the first time as a tragedy, the
second time as a farce.
Let us look at how Lenin approached the question of alliances with
other social classes and groups. During the era of the Tsar, one of the
immediate tasks of the Russian proletariat was to fight against the
autocracy of the Tsar. In The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats written by Lenin in 1897 while in Siberia, he wrote:
“In the democratic, political struggle, however, the Russian working
class does not stand alone; at its side are all the political opposition
elements, strata and classes, since they are hostile to absolutism and
are fighting it in one form or another. Here side by side with the
proletariat stand the opposition elements of the bourgeoisie, or of the
educated classes, or of the petty bourgeoisie, or of the nationalities,
religions and sects, etc., etc., persecuted by the autocratic
government. The question naturally arises of what the attitude of the
working class towards these elements should be. Further, should it not
combine with them in the common struggle against the autocracy? …
should they not, therefore, combine with all the elements in the
political opposition to fight the autocracy, setting socialism aside for
the time being? Is not this essential in order to strengthen the fight
against the autocracy?“Let us examine these two questions.
“The attitude of the working class, as a fighter against the
autocracy, towards all the other social classes and groups in the
political opposition is very precisely determined by the basic
principles of Social-Democracy expounded in the famous Communist Manifesto. The Social-Democrats support the progressive social classes against the reactionary classes … This support does not presuppose, nor does it call for, any compromise with non-Social-Democratic programmes and principles—it
is support given to an ally against a particular enemy. Moreover, the
Social-Democrats render this support in order to expedite the fall of
the common enemy, but expect nothing for themselves from these temporary allies, and concede nothing to them.“… This brings us to the second question. While pointing to the
solidarity of one or other of the various opposition groups with the
workers, the Social-Democrats will always single out the workers from
the rest, they will always point out that this solidarity is temporary
and conditional, they will always emphasise the independent class
identity of the proletariat, who tomorrow may find themselves in
opposition to their allies of today. We shall be told that “such action
will weaken all the fighters for political liberty at the present time.”
We shall reply that such action will strengthen all the fighters for
political liberty. Only those fighters are strong who rely on the
consciously recognised real interests of certain classes, and any
attempt to obscure these class interests, which already play a
predominant role in contemporary society, will only weaken the fighters.
That is the first point. The second point is that, in the fight against
the autocracy, the working class must single itself out, for it is the
only thoroughly consistent and unreserved enemy of the autocracy, only
between the working class and the autocracy is no compromise possible,
only in the working class can democracy find a champion who makes no
reservations, is not irresolute and does not look back. The hostility of
all other classes, groups and strata of the population towards the
autocracy is not unqualified; their democracy always looks back.“The proletariat alone can be—and because of its class position must
be—a consistently democratic, determined enemy of absolutism, incapable
of making any concessions or compromises. The proletariat alone can be
the vanguard fighter for political liberty and for democratic
institutions. Firstly, this is because political tyranny bears most
heavily upon the proletariat whose position gives it no opportunity to
secure a modification of that tyranny—it has no access to the higher
authorities, not even to the officials, and it has no influence on
public opinion. Secondly, the proletariat alone is capable of bringing
about the complete democratisation of the political and social system,
since this would place the system in the hands of the workers. That
is why the merging of the democratic activities of the working class
with the democratic aspirations of other classes and groups would weaken
the democratic movement, would weaken the political struggle, would
make it less determined, less consistent, more likely to compromise.
On the other hand, if the working class stands out as the vanguard
fighter for democratic institutions, this will strength the democratic
movement, will strengthen the struggle for political liberty, because
the working class will spur on all the other democratic and political
opposition elements, will push the liberals towards the political
radicals, will push the radicals towards an irrevocable rupture with the
whole of the political and social structure of present society.”
[Emphasis added]
We apologise if we have to quote lengthily from Lenin, but we wish to
avoid the practice of selective fragmentary quoting that many so-called
Leninists like to do.
So it is clear how the Bolsheviks approached other social classes in
the fight against absolutism: recognising that the proletariat and the
national bourgeoisie might have the same interests for specific goals,
but at the same time openly criticising the limitations of the
bourgeoisie in their fight, and warning against merging democratic
activities with them. In essence, the proletariat has to uphold its
class independence and not cast aside its socialist goal.
This was written in 1897, before the fateful 1905 Revolution that
brought the first blow to the autocracy and revealed even more the
bankruptcy of the national bourgeoisie. Here is what Lenin wrote in 1906
in “The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat” after the
betrayal and cowardice of the national bourgeoisie in their fight
against the autocracy:
“… the bourgeoisie as a whole is incapable of waging a determined
struggle against the autocracy; it fears to lose in this struggle its
property which binds it to the existing order; it fears an all-too
revolutionary action of the workers, who will not stop at the democratic
revolution but will aspire to the socialist revolution; it fears a
complete break with officialdom, with the bureaucracy, whose interests
are bound up by a thousand ties with the interests of the propertied
classes. For this reason the bourgeois struggle for liberty is
notoriously timorous, inconsistent, and half-hearted.”
The PKI, despite its claim of being Leninist, seems to have not read
carefully Lenin’s writings. The workers and peasants of Indonesia had to
pay dearly for the mistaken policy of the PKI: 32 years of military
dictatorship that robbed the whole generation of its class fighters and
tradition of class struggle.
The fall of Soeharto
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the bourgeoisie of the
whole world were celebrating. They sharpened their teeth even more with
their ideological assault. “Capitalism has triumphed,” so they claimed.
Indonesia was set as an example of how a country could prosper if
they embraced capitalism. However, beneath the “Indonesian miracle” was
the beginning of the movement that would eventually rock the whole
region. Early 1990 saw the formation of the nucleus of youth who would
later lead the struggle against Soeharto. These students were grouped
around the PRD, the only organised Left force at that moment, working
clandestinely under the threat of kidnapping and disappearance.
Early 1990 also saw the emergence of mass movements. The number of
peasant protests was increasing. The number of recorded workers’ strikes
rose in the 1990s, from 61 in 1990 to 300 in 1994 and even more went
unrecorded. This is because the economic miracle of Indonesia was built
on exploiting the workers and peasants. Jobs were getting hard to find
in the villages, and more and more peasants were forced into the cities
where they either settled as urban workers or urban poor.
The bourgeoisie was overconfident with their victory in 1991. So
confident were they that there would never be any more revolutions, that
they resorted to an orgy of speculation without any limits. Seven years
prior t the 1997 economic crisis, there was a huge influx of capital
into the Indonesian private sector, from $314 million in 1989 to $11.5
billion in 1996, an increase of 3500%. This massive private capital,
mostly in speculative short term investment in the real estate sector,
spurred economic growth reaching almost 10% a year. The bubble economy
had to burst sooner or later because at the end of the day all the
skyscrapers and apartments being built had no buyers. This was a classic
crisis of overproduction.
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was a disaster, not just economically
but also politically for the ruling class. Just 8 years before they had
been talking about the “end of history”, that there would be no more
bust in the capitalist economy and no more revolution. Here in
Indonesia, the country touted as the example of the superiority of
capitalism, the system crumbled. And the “floating masses” disintegrated
under the pressure.
From being hailed as the “father of development”, within months
Soeharto became the symbol of everything that the masses hated. In a
pre-revolutionary situation, one of the characteristics that we always
see is a split in the ruling class: between one section that seeks to
reform the system from above in order to prevent revolution from below
and another section that fears that any kind of reform will embolden the
masses further.
The radicalisation of the masses in the last 9 years had made
Soeharto’s position so untenable that even his most trusted man,
Harmoko, the Speaker of the Parliament, urged him to step down. The
capitalists, domestic and foreign, started abandoning him by suddenly
shedding crocodile tears about the repression of democracy under his
regime. A compromise was eventually struck: Soeharto was to resign but
no trial should ever be held, and the reformists would take the helm of
the movement, making sure that it went through a safe channel.
The Left, practically the PRD being the only organised force, was not
ready to take power. There were many factors at play, each one
reinforcing the other. The 32-year period of reaction under Soeharto was
definitely the main factor. The extent to which the workers’ movement
was defeated and decimated for a whole generation was so significant
that it still weighed heavily on the consciousness of the masses and its
leadership. Making matters worse was also the incorrect perspective on
the part of the PRD, which was to rely on the progressive bourgeoisie,
i.e. the reformist leaders.
The aftermath
The Reformasi movement did not change anything fundamental in
Indonesia. When it seemed that power was in the hands of the people,
with millions of people on the streets and occupying the parliament
building, the power was handed back to the ruling class. What actually
happened?
The reformists played exactly their historical role: saving
capitalism in its moment of crisis. Therefore, their betrayal is a given
factor; it is inevitable. Thus, any attempt to blame the failure of the
Reformasi 1998 on these reformists does not lead us one step further.
The accusation of “false reformist” (reformis gadungan) which has become
a catch word amongst the Left, particularly after the failure of the
1998 movement, shows the inability to comprehend the nature of bourgeois
reformers. These so-called “false reformists” are actually true
reformists.
The immediate task of the 1998 Reformasi was the overthrow of the
military dictatorship of Soeharto. We recognise that parliamentary
democracy is a better field for the working class to fight in. However,
it is one thing to recognise the need for a parliamentary democracy in
place of military dictatorship; it is another thing to expect that
parliamentary democracy can be realised by the bourgeois reformers. Only
the workers, in alliance with the peasants and urban poor, can be
relied on to carry out the democratic tasks to their completion. We
expect nothing from the bourgeoisie. The PRD’s reliance on the
progressive national bourgeoisie created confusion amongst the
rank-and-file of PRD and its periphery. When all the bourgeois reformers
betrayed the movement, the resulting ideological confusion created
demoralisation within the movement for the next 3-5 years. The only
answer provided is that these reformists were “false reformists”; thus
the campaign to seek true reformists began anew.
Could the Left, as it was at the time, have then taken power and
brought about the establishment of socialism in 1998? With the benefit
of hindsight, considering all the factors, we can say that the answer to
that question is negative. In order to take power, the workers needed a
party which was ready to take power. The 1965 defeat robbed the working
class of this chance. The PRD, the only party at that time, was too
young and it lacked the necessary leadership to be able to tackle the
question of power.
However, if the PRD had had a correct programme it could have emerged
stronger from the failure of the Reformasi movement. With correct
tactics, the PRD could have retreated in an orderly fashion and not be
splintered into many factions that opened up a period of demoralisation
afterwards. A good army is one that can retreat in an orderly fashion to
prepare for a new stronger assault.
This doesn’t mean that we don’t support reforms. We support reforms
as much as they still have a vital forcefulness, as much as they still
attack the base of the ruling regime. For example, when Gus Dur was
talking about abolishing the anti-communist law, the attitude of
revolutionaries should have been one of support for this demand but not
one of supporting the Gus Dur government. We agitate widely for this
demand on our own terms, which is that only a workers’ government
can completely fulfil this demand, that we can only trust the workers
to fulfil this demand. We expected nothing from the bourgeois liberal
government of Gus Dur. We support reforms always with a perspective of
workers conquering power. Only through this can we prepare the working
class for their historical task. With such a class independent policy,
the rank and file of a revolutionary party will not be confused. If
anything, they will gain more confidence and clarity for the upcoming
task.
The eventual fate of the PRD was the only logical conclusion of their
policy. With each passing year, the PRD drifted more and more towards a
class collaborationist policy. Many of its cadres joined bourgeois
parties. At first, in the eyes of those who are new to politics, the
PRD’s rhetoric still sounded radical and revolutionary. However, beneath
these revolutionary phrases one finds the idea of the “two-stages”, of
supporting the so-called progressive national bourgeoisie.
The final turning-point for the PRD was their coalition with the PBR,
a bourgeois party through and through, in the 2009 election. It was not
even a coalition as the PRD weren’t allowed to put forward their own
party name, flag, programme, etc. This electoral strategy was a complete
failure. The PRD/PAPERNAS was silent about the result. So, when in
their seventh congress earlier this year they changed their party’s
principle from “People’s Social Democracy” (which is just another name
for Marxism in the Indonesian context since the outright mentioning of
Marxism is illegal) to Pancasila [the official philosophical foundation
of the Indonesian state], it didn’t come as a big surprise. Unable to
learn from their mistaken policy of class collaboration, there was only
one way to go: return to the disastrous policy of the PKI.
Those within the PRD who deny that the PRD has held a class
collaborationist policy only have to look at where the PRD is now. Many
who denied this in the past finally realised it in the course of years,
and they either split away (PDS, KPRM, and the PRP which was not a
direct split from the PRD but a formation from the remnants of PRD
cadres) or quit the party altogether and went their own separate way.
Out of the many splits and polemics of the past 10 years, the
movement has gained ideological clarity. It has become clearer where
everyone stands. This is a painful process that every movement has to go
through. Those who make a hue and cry over the splits and pronounce
them as tragic don’t understand the dialectics of the movement. Unity is
needed on the Left, but not unprincipled unity that glosses over
theory. The workers need to unite on a clean banner, not one filled with
a hodgepodge of different ideas.
July 6, 2010
Militan (Indonesia)
[To be continued…]
1
Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its
History, Program, and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia, 1965) 166-223.
2 D.N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembaruan, 1958).
3 Aidit 49.
4 Aidit 64.
5 Aidit 57-58.
6 Aidit 62.
7 Aidit 58-59.